• Kindleberger (1989) :
"… the optimum may be a small number of actors, closely attuned to one another in an oligarchic relation, like-minded, applying strong pressure to keep down the chiselers and free-riders, prepared ultimately to accept responsibility."
Failure of Private Arrangements • Goodhart-Schoenmaker (1995) : "Although rescues financed on an implicit central bank-commercial banks basis may seem desirable, it is doubtful how far it will be sustainable much longer. These rescues depend on the cohesion of a well-defined group of banks, which are prepared to finance a selfsupporting regime under the leadership, usually, of a central bank." "…Greater competition has made commercial banks less willing to participate (in such cartels and coalitions), and reduced the clout of the central bank in dragooning unwilling volunteers."
Failure of Private Arrangements
• 1907 Crisis in New York:
• Commercial-bank clearing houses assisted Mercantile National Bank.
• Trust companies did not receive assistance, some were solvent.
-Some argue that commercial banks were threatened by the growth of trust companies. -JP Morgan started an attack on trust companies.
• Only after 2 weeks, JP Morgan organized a rescue plan.
• During this period, strong banks gained deposits.
• Morgan says he has done enough and wants a quit pro quo.
• Morgan's US Steel would acquire Tennessee Coal's assets (from Moore and Schley, a trust company) estimated to be worth $1 billion for $45 million.
• Creation of the Federal Reserve:
• Senator Aldrich: "We may not always have Pierpont Morgan with us to meet a banking crisis".
Strategic Behaviour
• Donaldson (1992):
• US data for the period 1873-1993
• Banks with excess liquidity exert market power and charge high interest rates to exploit other banks.
• Interest rates during panics higher than competitive rates -Evidence for the strategic behavior of banks with excess liquidity.
• LOLR can prevent cash rich banks from exploiting other banks.
Strategic Behaviour
• National City Bank (1893, 1907):
• National City had higher reserve and capital ratios.
• During the panic it gained deposits and loans relative to its competitors.
• Vanderlip's (Vice President) complaint in early 1907 that National City's low leverage and high reserve ratio was depressing profitability.
• Stillman (President): "What impresses me most important is to go into next Autumn (usually a time of financial stringency) ridiculously strong and liquid, and now is the time to begin and shape for it...If by able and judicious management we have money to help our dealers when trust companies have suspended, we will have all the business we want for many years."
Related Literature
• Goodfriend and King (1988):
-Efficient inter-bank market, solvent bank can always get liquidity.
-No need for LOLR -Provide liquidity to the market, inter-bank market takes care of the rest.
• Fed introduced 5 new facilities:
• Extended maturities
• Extended the range of collateral • Enough liquidity in aggregate but concentrated among a few players.
• Central bank as a LOLR
• Credible option for liquidity
• Supervisory and LOLR role of central banks.
Model
• Similar to Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) • There are 3 dates: t = 0, 1, 2.
• Banks:
-2 banks: Bank A and Bank B.
-Bank B always have some cash (cash-rich bank).
-Bank A can be hit by a liquidity shock so that it may need the cash.
-Bank A invests in risky assets at t = 0.
Model (cont.)
• Risky Asset:
• Invest 1 unit at t = 0.
• Return realized at t = 2.
• Risky assets return R t (Success) or 0 (Failure).
• At t = 1, there may be a liquidity shock.
• Bank needs to put liquidity of ρ into the project. Otherwise the return at t = 2 is 0.
Model (cont.)
Risky Asset:
• If the original bank (A) chooses the good project, the probability is p H .
• If the original bank chooses the bad project, the probability is p L .
• The other bank (B) has the probability , where p L < < p H
• Loss of value if assets change hands.
p p

Banks and moral hazard
Banks cannot fully pledge their future returns due to moral hazard (HT-98).
• Non-pecuniary benefit of b from choosing bad projects.
• Some of the profit has to go stay with banks
• Maximum interest satisfies:
Lending vs. Acquisition
• Purchase can be more profitable than lending:
• Bank B has liquidity at t = 1.
• Bank A needs liquidity at t = 1.
Bargaining game
• Solution:
• As increases, α* increases.
• As increases, increases.
• As increases, increases. Main Result
• If Bank B lends, it needs to leave some of the profits (R b ) to Bank A.
• There is a limit to how much it can earn by lending:
• However, it may force Bank A to sell some of its assets at low prices.
• Bank B may be able to earn more this way.
• Best user of assets is the original bank. So (excessive) sales result in welfare losses.
